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Part I
Looking Ahead
to Retirement
Chapter 1
New Paths to Retirement
Joseph F Quinn
One of the most important and intriguing phenomena in the United States
labor markets was the post-World War II early retirement trend: the fact that
older men left the labor force earlier and earlier with each succeeding
cohort. In 1950, 72 percent of all 65-year-old men were in the labor force,
either employed or actively looking for work. As shown in Table 1, this
percentage fell steadily over the next three and a half decades, reaching
about 30 percent by 1985, a decline ofwell over half. Even larger percentage
declines were observed for men over age 65: from 58 to 20 percent for those
age 68, from 50 to 16 percent age 70, and from 39 to 15 percent for those age
72. The decline was also unmistakable for those age 62, although it did not
begin until the 1960s when the earliest age of entitlement for social security
old-age benefits was lowered for men from 65 to 62. Significant declines also
occurred below the age of social security eligibility: from 85 to 71 percent at
age 60, and from 91 to 84 percent at age 55.
Economists and others have devoted considerable effort to trying to ex-
plain these large declines in older men's labor force attachment. Analysts
point to the increasing wealth of subsequent cohorts of Americans, and to
the fact that leisure (at the margin, at least) is a normal good. Thus earlier
retirement has been interpreted as one of the ways that Americans chose to
"spend" their increased wealth. Other experts focused more specifically on
the social security program, whose increased coverage and generosity over
time bestowed large windfall gains on past cohorts of retirees. Economists
also examined the details of social security's benefit calculation rules, and
demonstrated that many Americans faced substantial financial penalties if
they remained in the labor force too long: certainly beyond age 65, and for
some, even earlier (Quadagno and Quinn 1997). Benefits forgone because
ofcontinued work were never fully made up later.
Employer policies reinforced these downward trends in men's labor force
participation. Mandatory retirement rules, which once covered about half
of all American workers, forced departure from the firm (although not
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TABLE 1: Male Labor Force Participation Rates (%) by Age, 1950-1997
Age
Year 55 60 62 65 68 70 72
1950 90.6 84.7 81.2 71.7 57.7 49.8 39.3
1960 92.8 85.9 79.8 56.8 42.0 37.2 28.0
1970 91.8 83.9 73.8 49.9 37.7 30.1 24.8
1975 87.6 76.9 64.4 39.4 23.7 23.7 22.6
1980 84.9 74.0 56.8 35.2 24.1 21.3 17.0
1985 83.7 71.0 50.9 30.5 20.5 15.9 14.9
1990 85.3 70.5 52.5 31.9 23.4 17.1 16.4
1995 81.1 68.9 51.3 33.5 22.4 20.6 16.0
1997 83.4 68.3 52.6 32.4 22.4 21.7 17.3
Source: Burkhauser and Quinn (1997: table 1), updated by the author as in republished data
supplied by BLS.
from the labor force), usually at age 65. Defined benefit employer pensions,
which were the dominant form of coverage for those participating in pen-
sion plans in prior decades, often contained the same type ofwork disincen-
tives that social security did. Those who stayed on the job too long could
expect lower lifetime benefits (higher benefits per year, but for fewer years,
and not enough higher to compensate for the benefits initially forgone)
than those received by people who left earlier. These three factors, manda-
tory retirement, the financial incentives imbedded in social security and
many employer pension rules, and increasing levels of wealth, combined to
induce older Americans out of the labor force at earlier and earlier ages.
Evidence suggests that most of these retirements were voluntary: given the
options they faced, most workers chose to leave their jobs when they did. 1
The End of an Era?
This trend in older men's labor market attachment came to an end in the
mid-1980s. Indeed, men's participation rates stopped declining and have
actually increased in recent years. Figure 1 shows actual labor force par-
ticipation rates for men age 60 to 64 (traditionally, earlier retirement years)
as well as age 65 to 69 (traditional retirement years), along with a linear
extrapolation of the trend line between 1964 and 1985.2 Evidently the post-
war early retirement trend came to an abrupt halt in the mid-1980s, and
many more older men are working today than the pre-1986 trend would
have suggested.3
Labor force trends for older American women differ from those of men
in one regard, but are similar in another. Since World War II, married
women have entered the job market in increasing numbers, so older wom-
en's market attachment did not exhibit the dramatic declines that men's
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Figure 1. Labor force participation rates for men (%): ages 60-64 (top) and 65-69
(bottom). Source: USBLS (various years) and author's calculations.
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Figure 2. Labor force participation rates for women (%): ages 55-59 (top) and 60-
64 (bottom). Source: USBLS (various years) and author's calculations.
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rates did through the mid-1980s. Participation rates for younger women
rose substantially, with smaller increases at ages 55 to 59 and small declines
at ages 60 and over. Mter 1985, women's pattern grew similar to that of men,
as seen in Figure 2. For both age groups shown (ages 55-59 and 60-64),
women's labor force participation rates since 1985 have risen above what the
pre-1986 trend would have suggested. The same is true, although less dra-
matically, for women aged 65-69 and 70 or over. The similarity of the break
points in the male and female time series is striking. It is clear that some-
thing is very different today from what it was a decade and a half ago.
These changes are consistent with important policy initiatives that in-
creased work opportunities available to older workers and altered the rela-
tive attractiveness of work and retirement. As a result, the era of earlier and
earlier retirement appears to be over, at least for the near term.
What changes occurred to make the American labor market more en-
couraging (or at least less discouraging) toward work at older ages? First,
mandatory retirement has virtually been eliminated in the United States. In
the private sector, the earliest allowable age of mandatory retirement was
boosted from 65 to 70 in 1978; it was then outlawed entirely in 1986 for the
vast majority of American workers. This action created more flexibility for
those who wanted to work beyond the mandatory retirement age, and it also
sent an important message to society about the appropriate age to retire. 4
In addition, social security rules have changed several times and continue
to do so in ways that make work more attractive.5 The amount of income a
recipient can earn before losing social security benefits has been indexed to
wage growth since 1975, and higher exempt amounts were introduced in
1978 for those aged 65-71. The age at which the earnings test no longer
applied, permitting recipients to earn any amount without loss of benefits,
was lowered from 72 to 70 in 1983, and in 1990, the benefit loss for each
dollar earned over the exempt amount was cut from 50 to 33 cents for
recipients aged 65-69. Congress then legislated a set of increases in the
exempt amount for recipients aged 65-69 far in excess of the rate of wage
growth in 1996, and by 2002 workers receiving social security will be able to
earn up to $30,000 per year without losing benefits due to the earnings test.
Social security rule changes are also altering the financial rewards for
those who delay benefit receipt past the normal retirement age, currently
age 65. Within the system, the delayed retirement credit is defined as the
increase in subsequent benefits enjoyed by a potential recipient who delays
benefit receipt by one year. This credit was increased from 1 percent per
year ofdelay to 3 percent in 1977, and it is now being increased further from
three to 8 percent (by 2010) per year of delay. Eight percent is close to an
actuarially fair adjustment for the average worker, which means that the
present discounted value of expected social security benefits will no longer
decline because ofwork beyond age 65.6 Instead of penalizing work at older
ages, social security is now becoming more age-neutral. Another important
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change will also phase in soon. The normal age of eligibility for social
security benefits-the age at which one receives 100 percent of one's Pri-
mary Insurance Amount- has been age 65 since the creation of the pro-
gram 60 years ago. Between the years 2003 and 2008, however, the normal
retirement age will be increased from 65 to 66, and then raised further to
age 67 between 2021 and 2026. These changes are almost identical to across-
the-board benefit cuts, but they will also send an important societal message
about the appropriate age for retirement. 7
Important changes are also occurring in private sector inducements to
retire. There has been a movement away from defined benefit toward de-
fined contribution pension plans.8 As defined benefit plans decline in rela-
tive importance, so does their ability to discourage work and encourage
retirement. Defined contribution plans, in contrast, have none of the age-
specific work disincentives that defined benefit plans often contain; by their
very nature they are age-neutral.
A counter-argument to our "end of an era" conjecture is that the ob-
served reversal in the early retirement trend may only be a temporary hiatus
in the long-run decline in retirement ages - a decline made inevitable by
the increasing wealth of the nation and the desire of older Americans to
stop working. This argument suggests that once the social security rule
changes mentioned above are in force, older Americans' labor force par-
ticipation rates will resume their longtime decline. Buttressing this view is
the fact that the American economy has been very strong over the last de-
cade. The national unemployment rate fell from about 10 percent in 1983
to near 5 percentin 1989, and, following a brief recession in the early 1990s,
has fallen below 5 percent. Such a prosperous job market creates employ-
ment options for older workers who want to remain employed. Therefore
part of what appears to be a new labor market trend could actually be the
result of strong, but cyclical, labor demand. If so, the long-run participation
rate declines may resume when the economy falters. 9
Macroeconomic effects are undoubtedly important, but deeper changes
are also at work. There is a new attitude toward work late in life, encouraged
by public policy initiatives, shifts from manufacturing to less arduous service
occupations, and the realization that many 62-year-olds today can anticipate
two or more decades of healthy activity ahead. Although many may not want
to continue full time on their career jobs, many older people do want to re-
main active in the labor market, perhaps part-time, perhaps self-employed,
and perhaps in an entirely new line ofwork.
Survey evidence supports this view that many older Americans want to
work more. The Commonwealth Fund sponsored a survey of 3,500 older
Americans, men aged 55-64 and women aged 50-59. Of those no longer
employed, between 14 and 25 percent suggested that they would have pre-
ferred to work if a suitable job were available (McNaught, Barth, and Hen-
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derson 1989). Though far from a majority of the retirees, this percentage
did represent between 1 and 2 million potential workers. Among those still
employed, Quinn and Burkhauser (1994) found that a minority-another
million people - said that they expected to stop working before they really
wanted to. One interpretation of this response is that these individuals
expected to stop given the financial incentives that they faced (from social
security and employer pensions), but they would have wanted to continue
working in the absence of these work disincentives.
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, Gustman, Mitchell,
and Steinmeier (1995) report that many older Americans face hours con-
straints on their jobs. Among full-time workers aged 51-61 in 1992, 15
percent said that they would like to work more hours than they did, but
could not, as did about 20 percent of part-time workers. Similar numbers of
full-time workers (but many fewer part-timers) said they would like to work
fewer hours than they currently did.
How Do Older Americans Leave the Labor Force?
The retirement patterns of American workers are much more complicated
and varied than is often suggested by the stereotypical view of retirement as
a one-step transition directly from a career job to complete labor force
, withdrawal. lO Although the one-step pattern is still common, many older
Americans retire gradually and in stages, utilizing so-called "bridgejobs" on
the way out. ll Hence we believe that retirement is most fruitfully under-
stood as a process, rather than a single event. These insights are fruitfully
examined using the Health and Retirement Study (Quinn 1997b). In pre-
vious research, I have analyzed the 1992 and 1994 waves of the HRS; here,
we add to the analysis the third wave of data from 1996, when primary
respondents were age 55-65. Therefore a reasonable number of the respon-
dents had crossed the important age 62 threshold. 12
The word "retirement" means different things to different people: some
equate the term with total labor withdrawal, while others would include
people still working but who had cut back significantly on hours worked late
in life. Others deem retirement to be coincident with the receipt of retire-
ment benefits from social security or an employer pension, regardless of
labor force status, while still others use responses to subjective questionnaire
items; that is, the retired are those who call themselves retired. Here we
examine a different issue - the process by which older Americans leave
their full-time career jobs. As noted above, some move out of the labor force
directly from a full-time job. For these people, the timing of retirement is
relatively well-defined. But as we will see, others exit more gradually, utiliz-
ing transition or bridge jobs on the way out. In what follows, we study the
older American population to ask several questions: What is a bridge job?
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How important are bridge jobs to older Americans today? Do these jobs
tend to be full-time or part-time? How do they compare to workers' career
jobs? How important is self-employment in this process?
Retirement Patterns in the J 990s
Since we focus on the transition from work, the analysis sample excludes
people without work experience after age 49. Consequently, our HRS anal-
ysis sample consists ofabout 8,000 individuals who appear in each of the first
three waves of the HRS. In some of the analysis, we restrict this sample
further to concentrate on those for whom we can identify a career job,
defined as a full-time job that lasted or is expected to last for at least 10 years.
The subsample includes about 5,800 respondents, with 3,600 men and 2,200
women. At the time of the 1996 HRS survey, 38 percent of the respondents
were no longer working (36 percent of the men and 40 percent of the
women; see Table 2.) 13 By utilizing the longitudinal nature of the survey
data, we can look back in time and ask how these people moved out of
employment. The other 62 percent were still working - some still on full-
time career jobs (and we will have to wait to see how they retire) and others
on bridge jobs, often as part of the retirement process.
The evidence shows that employment rates declined over time as the HRS
respondents aged. In 1994, just two years earlier, 70 percent of this sample
had been working, and in 1992, nearly 80 percent had been employed. Each
subsequent wave of the HRS provides more insight into how people retire,
since more respondents have left the labor force each time. The effect of
age can also be seen in Figure 3, which shows HRS employment rates in 1996
by age and gender. Employment declined monotonically with age for both
men and women, and there are noticeable drops at ages 62 and 65, the ages
TABLE 2: Employment Status of HRS Respondents (%) with Work Experience After
Age 49
Men Women Total
1996
Employed 64 60 62
Not employed 36 40 38
1994
Employed 71 70 70
Not employed 29 30 30
1992
Employed 79 79 79
Not employed 21 21 21
Source: Author's calculations.
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Figure 3. HRS employment status by age and gender, 1996. Source: Author's
calculations.
of eligibility for early (actuarially reduced) and normal social security bene-
fits as well as for some employer pensions.
Figures 4 and 5 show part-time and self-employment patterns by gender
and age. The fraction of workers employed part-time rises with age (Figure
4), with dramatic jumps at ages 62 and 65, and the rate is generally higher
for women than for men. The proportion of self-employed men also rises
with age, with a noticeable jump at age 62, and it is higher for men than for
women (Figure 5). For the working women in our sample, there is little
change in the percentage self-employed below age 62, but the rate rises for
those 62 and older.
A look back: how did the respondents get where they are?The labor market status
of our HRS sample in 1996 is detailed in Figure 6. We differentiate between
those still on a career job in 1996 (full-time, and of at least 10 years dura-
tion) and those on a bridge job (either part-time, or less than 10 years
tenure), and then look back in time to identify their transition paths. l4 In
1996, 40 percent of the men were still working on career jobs (Figure 6a).
We will have to follow this group through subsequent waves of the HRS to
see how and when they retire. Thirty-six percent were not working at all (as
noted in Table 2), and nearly a quarter (23 percent) were working on what
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we define as a bridge job.15 Two-thirds of these bridge jobs were part-time;
the remaining third were full-time jobs that we anticipate will end with
under 10 years duration.
How did the 36 percent of the male sample that had already stopped
working by 1996 leave the labor market? As seen in Figure 6, nearly two-
thirds left directly from a full-time career job (the stereotypical retirement
pattern), while about 30 percent last worked on a bridge job before leaving
the labor force. About halfof these bridgejobs were part-time, and the other
halfwere full-time, but with less than 10 years tenure. Nearly a quarter of the
HRS men were working on bridge jobs in 1996. Of those for whom we had
good data, we find that about two-thirds of the people held full-time career
jobs prior to their bridge jobs, and they appear to be utilizing bridge jobs on
the way out of the labor force.
The experiences of the HRS women were somewhat different from those
of the men, mainly because bridge jobs appear to be more important (Fig-
ure 6). Slightly more of the women had stopped working by 1996 (40 versus
36 percent, despite the fact that the women are, on average, a bit younger),
and of those still at work, a higher proportion of the women were still
working on bridgejobs (43 versus 36 percent) .16 An even higher proportion
of the women's bridge jobs were part-time rather than short-duration in
nature (80 versus 65 percent). Of the women not working in 1996, nearly 60
New Paths to Retirement 23
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percent of those with good data on their lastjob last worked on a bridge job,
compared to only about 30 percent of the non-employed men. Again, wom-
en's bridge jobs were more likely to have been part-time rather than short
duration.
In other words, the HRS reveals a considerable amount of bridge job
activity among older Americans in the 1990s. Of those no longer employed,
nearly half (about 30 percent of the men and nearly 60 percent of the
women) last worked on a bridge job. Among those still working, between 36
percent (of the men) and 43 percent (of the women) were employed on a
bridge job. These numbers will change as people age, because some with
fewer than 10 years tenure in 1996 will work more or fewer years than we
expected, and because we do not know how those still on full-time career
jobs will exit. To estimate a lower bound on the importance of bridge job
activity, we could assume that none of those still working on full-time career
jobs in 1996 would use a bridge job on the way out. In this case, about one-
third of the men and nearly one-halfof the women will changejobs between
their last career job and complete labor force withdrawalP To determine
how our results vary with the definition of a career job, we also experi-
mented with requiring only eight or five years' duration, although the latter
seems a bit short to be defined as a "career" job. Table 3 shows, for each of
24 Joseph F. Quinn
Worked since
age 50
(N=4293)
Working, Working, Working, Not working now
bridge job full-time career OK (36%):
(23%) (40%) (2%) Last job
Full-time, Part-time OK Full-time, Bridge job OK
< 10 years (65%) (2%) career (26%) (6%)
(34%) (64%)
Worked since
age 50
(N=3695)
Working, Working, Working, Not working now
bridge job full-time career OK (40%):
(25%) (33%) (2%) Last job
Full·time, Part-time DK Full-time, Bridge job DK
<10 years (80%) (1%) career (52%) (11%)
(16%) (36%)
Figure 6. 1996job status ofHRS respondents with work experience since age 50: men
(top) and women (bottom). DK means respondent responded "don't know" to
relevant HRS question. Source: Author's calculations.
the three tenure definitions, the fraction working on a bridge job in 1996,
the fraction of those not working in 1996 whose lastjob was a bridge job, and
our lower bound estimate of the extent of bridge job activity (assuming that
none of those still working on a careerjob will utilize a bridgejob on the way
out). The qualitative conclusions remain unchanged though specific defini-
tions do make a difference. When we drop the tenure definition for a career
job from 10 to eight years, the difference in the extent of bridge job activity
is modest, on the order of five percent (Table 3). When we drop the defini-
tion to five years, the number of bridge jobs drops about 20 percent. But
even under this strict definition, our lower bound estimates suggest that
between a quarter (of the men) and 40 percent (of the women) -com-
pared to one third to half under the IO-year definition - pass through a
bridgejob late in life. Bridge job activity is thus seen to be an important part
of the labor force withdrawal process in America.
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TABLE 3: BridgeJob Activity of HRS Respondents (%) with Three Definitions of
Full-Time CareerJob
Percent Working Percent Not Working Lower Bound of
on a BridgeJob, "Whose LastJob Was BridgeJob
Full Time Career 1966" aBridgeJobb Activity'
Job Requires Men Women Men Women Men Women
10 years tenure 23 25 30 58 34 49
8 years tenure 21 24 29 55 32 46
5 years tenure 17 22 25 48 27 41
Source: Author's calculations,
Notes:
a From Fig, 6 for 10 years or more tenure, and analogous figures using tenure greater than or
equal to 8 or 5 years,
b For those not employed, bridge / (bridge + full-time career) on last job; see Fig, 6 for 10 year
tenure figures,
C People (currently working on bridge job) plus (not working and last job was a bridge job) as a
percent of all those with work experience since age 50, We ignore the DKs, and assume that
none of those currently working on a full-time careerjob utilize a bridgejob on the way out.
A look forward: how did those with career jobs leave them? Thus far, we have
implicitly assumed that a part-time or a short duration job late in someone's
work career indicates gradual or partial retirement. This might not be true
for some workers whose job histories consist of a series of part-time or
shortduration jobs. Therefore, we conducted additional analysis on just the
subsample for whom we could identify a full-time career job. For these
workers, a bridge job would represent a change in behavior. For each indi-
vidual with work experience after age 49, we searched the HRS survey re-
sponse to identify some prior career job. IS If we did find one, we then
proceeded forward in time to see how (if at all) the individual left that
career job. HRS information on the current, last (for those no longer work-
ing), and prior jobs revealed a career job for most of the men (84 percent)
and for 60 percent of the women analyzed above. 19
Retirement transitions for men and women where we can identify a full-
time career job appear in Figure 7. About 44 percent of these men were still
working on their full-time career jobs, about 28 percent moved out of em-
ployment directly from their career jobs, and a quarter moved to a bridge
job,20 (Most of them were still on this bridge job in 1996; some had subse-
quently moved out of employment altogether,) Of those who had already
left their full-time career jobs and for whom we have good data, nearly half
(47 percent) moved to a bridge job rather than directly out of employment.
Transition data for career women tell a similar story (Figure 7b). Of those
who had left their career jobs by 1996, about half (49 percent) moved next
to a bridge job rather than directly out of employment. In general, exit
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Halle or had a full-time job
(N=3593)
Still on full-time
career job
(44%)
Full-time career:
Bridge
(19%)
Full-time career:
Bridge - Out
(6%)
Full-lime career.
Undetermined - Out
(4%)
Full-time career.
Out
(28%)
Have or had a full-time job
(N=2227)
Still on full-time
career job
(51%)
Full-time career:
Bridge
(17%)
Full-time career.
Bridge - Out
(6%)
Full-time career:
Undetermined - Out
(2%)
Full-time career.
Out
(24%)
Figure 7. Job transitions of HRS respondents with a full-time career job: men (top)
and women (bottom). Source: Author's calculations.
patterns of career men and women look more similar than do those of all
men and women in general.
Prior research suggests that self-employed and wage-and-salary workers
leave their career jobs in different ways, and that crossovers between classes
of worker are common late in life (Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1991).
The HRS data confirm both of these surmises. Of the wage and salary work-
ers, 46 percent was still on career jobs in 1996,37 percent was not working
(some of whom had moved to and then out of a bridge job in the interim),
and 16 percent was employed on a post-career bridge job (Figure 8). Of
those who had left their career jobs by 1996, nearly half (44 percent) moved
to bridge jobs. Of those who did move to a bridge job (whether still on it or
not in 1996), nearly two-thirds moved from full-time to part-time status and
nearly a quarter moved from the wage-and-salary world to self-employment.
This is one of the reasons why self-employment is more prevalent among
older workers than it is among the labor force in general. For some older
Americans, self-employment provides the means for gradual retirement,
with additional flexibility with respect to hours and type ofwork.
By contrast, among those who were self-employed in their career jobs, 77
percent was still working in 1996, compared to only 62 percent of the wage-
and-salary workers (Figure 8). The majority of the employed was still on ca-
reer jobs, but some had switched to bridge jobs. Of those who had switched,
more than half (54 percent) moved from full-time to part-time status, and
about a third switched from self-employment to wage-and-salary work. Al-
though the proportion of self-employedjob switchers moving to a wage and
salary job is higher than the reverse, there is still a net increase in the
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IHave or had afull-time career job I
(N=5040)
Full-time career: Still on full-time Full-time career: Full-time career: Full-time career:
Bridge career job Out Undetermined - Out Bridge -Out
(16%) (46%) (28%) (3%) (6%)
ISE on bridge job IIW+S on bridge job I ISE on bridge job II W+S on bridge job I
(24%) (76%) (18%) (82%)
Figure 8. Job transitions of HRS career wage and salary workers with a full-time
career job: wage and salary workers (W+S) (top); self-employed workers (SE) (bot-
tom). Source: Author's calculations.
number of self-employed, because of the much larger number of career
wage-and-salary workers.
Comparisons Between Career Jobs and Bridge Jobs
We next follow the transitions of those career employees who moved to
bridge jobs, and we ask how the two jobs compare. 2 ! About 60 percent of the
bridge jobs involved part-time work, whereas all the career jobs, by defini-
tion, were full-time. Table 4 categorizes the jobs by white collar /blue collar
status and by skill level. About three-quarters of those who switched to a
bridge job stayed in the same job category, and for those who switched cate-
gories there was a net movement down the socioeconomic ladder. About 70
percent of those who switched moved down the scale, and only 30 percent
moved up. The largest increase occurred among those in blue-collar jobs
without high skill requirements, which increased from 13 percent of the
career jobs to 21 percent of the bridge jobs.
Slippage can also be seen in Table 5, which tabulates workers' hourly wage
rates on both career and bridge jobs. Only about one-third of these workers
earned less than $10 per hour on their career jobs, but 60 percent did on
their post-career jobs, mostly in the $5 to $10 per hour category. At the
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TABLE 4: Occupational Status ofHRS Respondents Moving from Career to Bridge
Jobs (%)
Initial Full-Time CareerJob
Subsequent White Collar White Collar Blue Collar Blue Collar
BridgeJob Highly Skilled Other Highly Skilled Other Total
White collar, 79 15 9 6 41
highly skilled
White collar, 6 67 4 1 14
other
Blue collar, 8 9 64 11 24
highly skilled
Blue collar, 7 6 23 82 21
other
Total 45 15 27 13 100
Source: Author's calculations.
TABLE 5: Wage Rate ofHRS Respondents Moving from Career to BridgeJobs (%)
Subsequent
Initial Full-Time CareerJob Wage Rate ($/hour)BridgeJob Wage
Rate ($/hour) 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-30 30+ Total
0-5 51 19 14 15 1 4 18
5-10 26 64 44 34 34 24 43
10-15 16 12 27 19 15 8 18
15-20 1 3 9 2 6 8 8
20-30 3 1 3 7 25 24 7
30+ 1 2 2 6 9 32 6
Total 9 26 28 17 14 6 100
Source: Author's calculations.
upper end of the spectrum, 20 percent of these workers earned over $20 per
hour in career employment, but only 13 percent did on their bridge jobs.
Overall, only about one-third of these job switchers stayed in the same wage
category in Table 5. Of those who did not stay in the same status/ skill cell,
three quarters moved down at least one wage rate category, while only one-
quarter moved up.
Conclusion
We present evidence suggesting that the post-war trend toward earlier re-
tirement for men has come to a halt. Many more older Americans are
working today than the pre-1986 trends would have suggested. Explanations
for this change in trend include the elimination of mandatory retirement,
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changes in the work incentives imbedded in social security rules, the steady
increase in the importance of defined-eontribution pension programs, and
the strength of the American economy over most of the past decade.
We also explored the complex and numerous paths to retirement revealed
in the Health and Retirement Study. Bridge jobs are emphasized, which are
part-time or short-durationjobs between career employment and complete
labor force withdrawal. Our research shows that many older Americans do
retire gradually, often using part-time jobs or stints of self-employment on
the way out. Exit routes from career employment are many and varied, and
the traditional one-step retirement pattern is no longer the norm it once
was. These transitional stages in the retirement process will probably grow
more important through time as the nation ages, and as the large baby-boom
cohorts contemplate how and when to leave the world ofwork.
The author thanks the Retirement Research Foundation, the Employee
Benefit Research Institute, and the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research for research support, Kevin Cahill for excellent research assis-
tance, and Olivia Mitchell for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
Notes
1. The financial incentives imbedded in social security and many defined-benefit
pension rules created pay cuts for older workers. Total annual compensation in-
cludes both the paycheck and any changes in social security and pension wealth (the
present value offuture benefits) that accrue during that year ofwork. Many pension
systems are set up so that after some age, these presentvalues begin to decline. At this
point, the annual "accruals" become negative, and one's compensation (the pay-
check minus the loss in retirement wealth) declines. Faced with these implicit pay
cuts, many workers chose to retire. Under these circumstances, the distinction be-
tween voluntary and involuntary retirement is a fuzzy one. See Quinn (1991) for a
discussion of these issues.
2. The trends are based on simple linear regressions with a constant and a time
trend. Figures 1 and 2 are updated from Quinn (1997a).
3. To estimate the magnitude ofthis change, Burkhauser and Quinn (1997: table 2)
multiplied the difference between the actual 1996 participation rates and rates pre-
dicted by the pre-1986 extrapolations by the population figures for men at these ages.
The results indicate that an additional 1.4 million men age 60-69 were working in
1996.
4. The net effect of the elimination of mandatory retirement on retirement pat-
terns was probably small, since financial incentives to retire remained ill many public
and private pension schemes. Burkhauser and Quinn (1983) estimated that at least
half ofwhat looked like a mandatory retirement effect was actually due to the simul-
taneous financial incentives.
5. The changes outlined in the next several paragraphs can be found in the Social
Security Administration's Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin
(1996), tables 2.A20, 2.A29.
6. Inadequate delayed retirement credits meant that benefits forgone because of
continued work were never fully made up via higher benefits in the future. This loss
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in social security wealth was the "pay cut" mentioned earlier. Of course, a delayed
retirement credit that is actuarially fair on average will not be so for individual workers
with different life expectancies.
7. Waiting longer for a given benefit is the same as getting a smaller benefit at any
given age. Imagine an upward sloping line showing the relationship between age of
initial receipt (on the horizontal axis) and monthly benefit (on the vertical axis.) A
benefit cut would lower the line; a benefit delay would move it to the right. Although
these two changes are indistinguishable, they can have very different interpretations.
Describing the change as a benefit cut makes it appear that the benefit was too high,
an opinion with which many recipients and elderly advocates would disagree. De-
scribing the change as a benefit delay makes it sound like the amount was correct,
but the age was wrong, a view which resonates with many more people, given the
increases in life expectancy Americans have enjoyed. Despite the different inter-
pretations, however, the policies are nearly identical.
8. The proportion of employer pension plan participants whose primary coverage
is in a defined-contribution plan increased from 13 to 30 percent between 1975 and
1985, and then to 42 percent in 1992. Including secondary plans, which are nearly all
defined-contribution, the proportion of participants in defined-contribution plans
doubled from 26 to 52 percent between 1975 and 1993, and then rose slightly to 53
percent (estimate) by 1997 (Olsen and VanDerhei 1997, table 2).
9. Peter Diamond has pointed out (in private correspondence) that labor force
participation rates for older American men were also very flat in the late 1960s, when
the economy was very strong and the unemployment rate was on its way to a postwar
low of 3.5 percent. When the economy sagged in the 1970s, participation rates began
to tumble, as one can see in Figure I (especially for ages 65 to 69.) The next recession
may cast some light on this debate.
10. See Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990) for a more extensive discussion of
this point.
II. In this research, we define a "career job" as a full-time job of at least 10 years
tenure. A "bridge job," therefore, can be a part-time job of any length or a full-time
job ofless than 10 years duration.
12. SeeJuster and Suzman (1995) along with other papers in the same volume for
an overview of the Health and Retirement Study.
13. Employment rates for this HRS subsample are not comparable to labor force
participation rates published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, because we have
eliminated those individuals with no worker experience after age 49, and are looking
at employment rather than labor forcelparticipation, which includes those not em-
ployed and actively searching for~e the HRS oversamples blacks and His-
panics, sample weights are provided so hat the estimates will better represent popu-
lation percentages. All percentages use in this paper are weighted.
14. For those still working in 1996, the concept ofjob duration is a fluid one. Some
full-time workers were on jobs with less than 10 years duration in 1996, but will
probably have more than 10 years tenure by the time they leave. Therefore, what
appears to be a "bridge job" by our definition might prove to be a "10-year or more"
careerjob when it is over. Rather than classiry all jobs with less than 10 years duration
in 1996 as bridge jobs, as though all these workers werejust about to leave, we assume
here that full-time workers younger than 62 remain on their currentjobs until age 62
and those still employed after age 62 remain until age 65. There is no need for any
such assumption for those working part time (the majority of those on bridge jobs),
since we consider part-time jobs to be bridge jobs no matter what the duration. We
then classiry the 1996 jobs as either "career" or "bridge" depending on their (as-
sumed) eventual tenure.
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15. A small percentage (2 percent) of these men and women were known to be
bworking, but missing data prevented us from discerning whether they were em-
ployed on full-time careerjobs.
16. These are the ratios of those on a bridge job to those on a bridge or a full-time
career job. Those whose career or bridge job status cannot be determined are ig-
nored in these calculations.
17. These estimates add those on bridge jobs in 1996, plus those who already left
the labor market via a bridge job.
18. We return to the original definition here - more than 1600 hours per year, and
10 or more years duration.
19. In defining this subsample of career workers, we do not have to assume that
workers remain on their current jobs until age 62 or age 65. For those who leave
these career jobs by 1996, we can calculate the actual tenure at transition to define
the job one leaves as either career or bridge. On the other hand, for those who take
anotherjob when they leave their careerjobs, we do assume they remain on the post-
career job until age 62 (or age 65 for those already 62 or older) when deciding to
describe it as a bridge job or as another careerjob.
20. A small number moved out of employment via an intermediate job, but data
deficiencies prevent us from determining whether the intervening job was a bridge
job or another careerjob.
21. Tables 4 and 5 contain very preliminary data. The early-release version of
Wave 3 is missing data on occupational status and wage rates, so the comparisons in
these tables are based on those career workers who switched to a bridge job by 1994
(Wave 2).
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